Labor Law - Duty to Bargain - Performance Bond Not a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining by Caffrey, Thomas F.
Volume 7 Issue 2 Article 10 
1961 
Labor Law - Duty to Bargain - Performance Bond Not a Mandatory 
Subject of Bargaining 
Thomas F. Caffrey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas F. Caffrey, Labor Law - Duty to Bargain - Performance Bond Not a Mandatory Subject of 
Bargaining, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 300 (1961). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss2/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
LABOR LAW-DUTY To BARGAIN-PERFORMANCE BOND NOT A
MANDATORY SUBJECT OF BARGAINING.
Local 164, Bhd. of Painters v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 1961).
Appellant labor union submitted a new contract to the Cheatham
Painting Company at a bargaining meeting held prior to the expiration
of an existing contract. Section 12 of the proposed agreement provided
for the posting of a five thousand dollar performance bond by the com-
pany, which bond was to be forfeited to the union in the event of any
substantial breach' of the agreement by the company. With one ex-
ception,2 all the other provisions of the contract were agreed upon and
the union and the company became deadlocked over section 12. Be-
cause of the impasse, strikes were called by the union at all Cheatham
jobs in Florida. The company's ensuing charge of an unfair labor
practice resulted in the issuing of a complaint by the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board, charging the union with violating
section 8(b) (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act), 3 on the ground that it had refused to sign a contract in which
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment had been
agreed upon. The National Labor Relations Board held that the union
had refused to bargain collectively with the employer in refusing to sign
the agreement unless the performance bond provision was included, and
ordered the union to cease and desist from insistence upon its inclusion
in the agreement. 4 The United States Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit, with one judge dissenting, held that, in insisting upon
the performance bond, the union had left the sphere of "terms and condi-
tions of employment" and conditioned its willingness to sign the agree-
ment on a matter outside the statutory area of compulsory collective
bargaining.5 A petition to set aside the Board's order was denied and
1. The determination of whether or not an alleged breach was substantial
was to be made by a Joint Trade Board as provided for elsewhere in the agreement.
293 F.2d 133, 134 (1961).
2. There was also some disagreement between the union and the company over
section 13 which related to the employment of painters in areas outside of Jackson-
ville, Fla. The dispute on that point was settled to the satisfaction of the parties
by the Board's order and therefore was not in issue in the instant case. 293 F.2d
133, 134, n.1 (1961).
3. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958) "(b) It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agent . . . (3) To refuse to bargain col-
lectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title; .
4. 126 N.L.R.B. 997 (1960).
5. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958) : "(d) For the purposes of this
section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there-
under, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession ..... [Emphasis added].
(VOL. 7
1
Caffrey: Labor Law - Duty to Bargain - Performance Bond Not a Mandatory Su
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1962
WINTER 1961-62]
enforcement was ordered. Local 164, Bhd. of Painters v. NLRB, 293
F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
One of the effects of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(Taft-Hartley Act), in amending the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 (Wagner Act), was to place the employer and employee on a
nearer-to-equal footing in the area of collective bargaining.6 The pro-
tection from unfair labor practices previously enjoyed only by the
employee and the union became available to the employer as well.
The instant case is concerned with the duty of the union to bargain
collectively in good faith with regard to mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining as provided in the statute. Thus, it is essential to bear in mind
that the identical nature of the union's duty and the employer's duty
in this area, as defined by Section 8(d) of the Act,7 is such as to permit
judicial and administrative precedent in one case to be applied without
reservation to the other. Of primary importance to the decision in the
instant case was the five to four decision of the United States Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.8 There, in
holding that a clause regulating the manner in which the union could call
a strike9 was not a "term or condition of employment", and that in-
sistence upon the inclusion thereof in a collective bargaining agreement
constituted a refusal to bargain, the Court introduced a new concept into
the law of collective bargaining. Certain subjects which previously would
have been deemed mandatory or non-mandatory, as determined by the
good faith or lack thereof of the insisting party,10 could now be classified
as voluntary subjects, that is, subjects which may be bargained over
if both parties are willing, but upon which neither party can be compelled
to bargain. The instant case came in the wake of that decision and was
found to be controlled by it. Like the pre-strike ballot clause in Borg-
Warner, the performance bond clause was labeled a non-mandatory,
voluntary subject of collective bargaining.
In a determination of whether or not it was correct for the court
to conclude in the instant case that a performance bond proposal is not a
"term or condition of employment", it is necessary to consider the re-
6. For Congressional declaration of purpose and policy see 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1958); Findings and declaration of policy, 61 Stat. 136(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
7. See note 5 supra.
8. 356 U.S. 342, 78 S. Ct. 718 (1958).
9. A certified international union submitted a proposed bargaining contract.
The employer made a counter-proposal, recognizing the local union only as bargain-
ing agent and providing that a strike could not be called, or the contract ter-
minated or modified, unless a majority of employees in the unit, including non-union
members, approved such action by secret ballot.
10. In NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 100, enforced 133
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943), it was held that the refusal of the employer to agree to
a proposal whereby discrimination based upon union affiliation would be prohibited,
demonstrated bad faith. The abandonment of this approach is indicated by the
Court in Borg-Warner, citing the Dalton case, infra, note 20, in support of the
proposition that good faith is immaterial if the subject is not within the area of
mandatory bargaining.
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action of the Board: and the 'courts to such a provision in the past.
While the Board's decision in the instant case indicates that this is only
the second case in its history involving a union's insistence on a per-
formance bond," cases involving insistence by an employer will serve
equally well to illustrate the Board's position. Performance bond clauses
have been before the Board on numerous occasions and without exception
have been treated as being beyond the scope of mandatory collective
bargaining.12 As early as 1940, the Board pronounced unequivocally, in
speaking of a company's insistence that a union post a ten thousand dollar
performance bond:
The respondent, in refusing to execute a signed agreement
binding upon both parties, unless the union posted a bond, sought
to prefix the fulfillment of its statutory obligation with a condition
not within the provisions, and manifestly inconsistent with the
policy of the Act.' 3
Admittedly this decision was pre-Taft-Hartley, but it is demon-
strably clear from a later decision of the Board that no fundamental change
occurred in its approach subsequent to the passing of the Act. In 1951,
the Board was confronted by a case wherein the respondent employer
insisted that those earlier decisions of the Board which indicate that
insistence upon a performance bond was unlawful were not controlling
under the amended Act. In the words of the Board: "The Respondents
clearly revealed that a performance bond was still a condition precedent
to agreement. By such insistence we find that Respondents violated
section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act". 14 More recently, in 1959, the Board
found that an employer refused to bargain in violation of section 8(a) (5)
and (1) of the Act by its insistence, as a condition to entering into a
contract, that the certified union, a local, post a one hundred thousand
dollar performance bond or, in lieu thereof, that the international parent
union also sign the contract.' 5 Another post-Borg-Warner decision of the
Board that is significant involved a provision that liability for violation
of the contract's no-strike clause should extend to the full resources
of the local's international parent. The Board found that the respondent
employer had violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by insisting
on the inclusion of such a clause as a condition to signing.'6 This last-
mentioned case is of special interest for two reasons: (1) it specifically
11. The earlier case, Teamsters (Conway's Express) 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949),
was the subject of judicial proceedings, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952), but the
Board's ruling on the bond issue was not contested.12. Brown and Root, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 520 (1949); Cookeville Shirt Co., 79
N.L.R.B. 667 (1948); Benson Produce Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 888 (1946); InterstateSteamship Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 1307 (1941); Scripto Manufacturing Co., 36 N.L.R.B.
411 (1941) ; Jasper Blackburn Products Corp., 21 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1940).
13. Jasper Blackburn Products Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 1240, 1254 (1940).
14. I.B.S. Manufacturing Co.. 96 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1269 (1951).
15. Casco Products Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 766 (1959).
16. North Carolina Furniture, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 41 (1958).
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cites Borg-Warner as controlling its decision; (2) unlike the Trial
Examiner, the Board found it unnecessary to consider the good or bad
faith of the employer' 7 but rather based its finding of an unfair labor
practice squarely on the fact that the provision in question did not
relate to "wages, hours, and conditions of employment" within the mean-
ing of section 8(d) of the Act. The validity of this analogy drawn between
a liability clause and a performance bond clause cannot be questioned;
indeed, it is insisted upon in a previously discussed case.' 8 The two
clauses function identically; they insure the insisting party to some degree
against the possibility of a financial loss in the event of a breach by the
other party to the agreement.
Unfortunately for the purposes of this analysis, cases involving per-
formance bonds and the duty to bargain collectively have not been
frequently before the courts.1 9 The court in the instant case found it
necessary to rely for support on a 1951 decision of the Fifth Circuit in-
volving an employer's insistence that the union register under a Georgia
statute so as to make it an entity amenable to suit in the state courts. 20
Some difficulty lies in determining the validity of the application of such
cases to a post-Borg-Warner situation. It is true that for all practical
purposes the courts and the Board prior to Borg-Warner were unable to
conceive of insistence to the point of impasse upon a non-mandatory
subject of collective bargaining as being compatible with the requirement
of good faith. A violation of section 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3) by the mere
fact of uncompromising insistence, without any reference to good or bad
faith, was unknown before the Borg-Warner decision. It is submitted,
however, that it need not be a necessary consequence of this fact that
such cases are sapped of all vitality as precedent. Two propositions re-
main true in spite of the modified approach of the courts under Borg-
Warner: (1) traditionally, provisions relating to enforcement of a bar-
gaining agreement have not been considered within the statutory man-
date; (2) the financial responsibility of one of the parties to the
agreement (usually the union) has consistently been considered a matter
beyond the scope of mandatory bargaining. Oftentimes, as in the instant
case, the two co-exist in the same clause; performance of the contract is
sought to be secured by incorporating the financial liability of a party
directly into the contract.
17. It is interesting to contrast Economy Stores, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 1 (1958),
with the case cited in note 15, supra. In the few months between the decisions,
the Borg-Warner case was decided by the Supreme Court; its effect can be detected in
the Board's regard for the element of good faith in the two cases.
18. Casco Products Co., note 15, supra.
19. In one of the few cases involving performance bonds to get beyond the
Board, Taormina Company, 94 N.L.R.B. 884 (1951), the Court of Appeals, in
enforcing, relied on grounds other than the performance bond provision. 207 F.2d
251 (5th Cir. 1953).
20. NLRB v. Dalton Telephone Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 824, 72 S. Ct. 43 (1951).
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Immediately after the Borg-Warner decision, it was not possible to
tell whether the effect of that decision would be to lead the Board and
the courts to exchange their role as usher to the bargaining table for that
of referee.21 Having decided that a category should exist of bargaining
proposals that may properly be introduced at the bargaining table but
which cannot be insisted upon to the point of impasse, it remained only
for the Court to specify those subjects that may be considered voluntary.
It would seem that if the instant case were to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court, the decision would do much to indicate whether it was the intention
of the Court to (1) narrowly construe "terms and conditions of em-
ployment", by characterizing provisions such as a performance bond
clause as a voluntary subject, or (2) construe the phrase broadly to
include nearly all reasonable proposals insisted upon in good faith at
the bargaining table. The District of Columbia Circuit, upon the authority
of the Fifth Circuit in Dalton, has, at least at first glance, committed
itself to a position favoring governmental regulation of the substantive
solution of labor-management differences. The case of NLRB v. Insurance
Agent's International Union, decided subsequently to Borg-Warner,
militates strongly against the taking of that position.2 2 In that case the
Supreme Court said:
[I]t remains clear that section 8(d) was an attempt by Congress to
prevent the Board from controlling the settling of the terms of col-
lective bargaining agreements. . . . Congress intended that the
parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted
by any governmental powers to regulate the substantive solution of
their differences. . . Our labor policy is not presently erected on a
foundation of government control of the results of negotiations. 23
[Emphasis added.]
This decision, uttered by the Court while still standing in the shadow of
Borg-Warner, indicates clearly that the use of economic pressure by the
parties to a bargaining agreement was not intended to be curtailed as a
result of the Borg-Warner decision. The Court was explicit in holding that
tactics bringing economic pressure to bear upon a party already bargaining
in good faith over a mandatory subject would not adversely affect the
good faith of the other party at the bargaining table. Taking the Borg-
Warner and Insurance Agents' decisions together, it appears that the
Court hopes to tread a middle path, at once restricting the area of collective
bargaining (to a degree yet undetermined), while preserving the corner-
stone of collective bargaining - the use of economic pressure. As long as
the question of good or bad faith at the bargaining table is uninfluenced
by the simultaneous exercise of economic pressure, it would seem that
21. See Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1957,
44 VA. L. Rzv. 1057, 1074-1086 (1958).
22. 361 U.S. 477, 80 S. Ct. 419 (1960). Edgerton, J., dissenting in the instant
case, relies to some extent on this decision of the Supreme Court.
23. Id. at 487, 488, 490, 80 S. Ct. 426, 427.
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